

Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 INR-10 MCE-00 ABF-01 OMB-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3716

SECDEF FOR ISA/NESA

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TAGS: MASS, JO, PGOV, US, XF

SUBJECT: MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUESTS FOR JORDAN

REF: A)SECDEF

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D) AMMAN 1271(S) 7 FEB 78

E) STATE 44128(S) DTG 201933Z FEB 78

F) 64944(C) DTG 141724Z MAR 78

1. AS WE APPROACH THE FORTHCOMING JMC MEETING BETWEEN THE US AND JORDAN IN WASHINGTON, I BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO REVIEW WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE ON THE MILITARY MATERIEL REQUEST THAT KING HUSSEIN PRESENTED TO SECRETARY VANCE IN DECEMBER, 1977. IN THE JORDANIAN VIEW, THE ONLY CONCRETE RESPONSE TO THE KING'S REQUEST HAS BEEN THE EXPEDITED DELIVERY OF ONE BATTERY OF SIX M-109A1B SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZERS. THIS IS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO KING HUSSEIN, AS WELL AS TO SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES. OUR RESPONSE TO THE KING'S REQUEST IS BEING READ OERE AS AN INDICATION OF THE PRIORITY AND IMPORTANCE-OR LACK THEREOF-THAT WE ACCORD TO JORDAN, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE INTENSE CONCENTRATION ON THE SAUDI/EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI "PACKAGE DEAL." OUR PERFORMANCE SO FAR HAS BEEN MORE VERBAL THAN TANGIBLE. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE WE EXPECT

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KING HUSSEIN TO PLAY EVENTUALLY IN THE PEACE PROCESS WE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE A SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE TO HIS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE CONCERNS. WE SHOULD EXERT OURSELVES TO BE FORTHCOMING, WHERE WE CANNOT BE, FOR POLICY OR OTHER REASONS, WE NEED A COGENT EXPLANATION OF WHY WE CANNOT BE.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME AREAS IN WHICH I THINK WE CAN, AND

SHOULD, IMPROVE OUR RESPONSIVENESS:

A. PROVIDE P&B DATA ON A MORE TIMELY BASIS:

ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WE HAVE FACED IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE LIST AND IN HELPING THE GOJ TO REALISTICALLY EVALUATE ITS NEEDS AND ABILITY TO FINANCE THESE NEEDS, IS THE INORDINATELY LONG TIME IT TAKES TO OBTAIN PRICING DATA. ACCORDING TO THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE SALES MANUAL (PART III, PARA 7E(4)) WE SHOULD BE RECEIVING P&B DATA WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER A REQUEST IS RECEIVED BY DEFENSE. WE USUALLY WAIT FAR LONGER THAN THAT. WE BELIEVE THERE ARE ITEMS ON THE LIST THAT JORDANIANS MIGHT DECIDE NOT TO PURCHASE ONCE THEY KNOW THE COSTS, YET WE SEEM TO BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE THE LATEST FIGURES WITH ANY REASONABLE DEGREE OF TIMELINESS.

B. EXPEDITED DELIVERY OF EQUIPMENT:

IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE DONE OUR UTMOST TO EXPEDITE DELIVERIES OF EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY ARTILLERY, IF THE EARLIER DELIVERY OF ONE BATTERY OF 155MM SP ARTILLERY IS TO BE OUR SOLE IMMEDIATE GESTURE IN THIS REGARD. THE ACCELERATED DELIVERY OF 8" HOWITZERS IN 1980 (REF STATE 311120) IS SO FAR OFF AS TO HAVE NO CURRENT IMPACT. WE UNDERSTAND JORDAN IS TO BE GIVEN FIRST DELIVERY FROM PRODUCTION. WE FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT NO SUCH QUANTITIES WILL BE PRODUCED UNTIL THE EARLY 1980'S. CAN YOU CONFIRM THIS AND WHAT THIS STATEMENT REALLY MEANS. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS A VERY DIFFICULT AREA FOR THE USG, BUT IT IS THE ONE WHICH THE GOJ CONSIDERS THE MOST TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO BE OF HELP. ALSO, SECRET

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CAN DELIVERY OF ADDITIONAL 155 SP GUNS BE ACCELERATED?

C. RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT:

(1) THIS HAS BECOME AN ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE MATTER WITH THE JORDANIANS, WHO FEEL ACUTELY AWARE OF THEIR TREATMENT COMPARED WITH THE ISRAELIS. THEY POINT OUT THAT WE SHOW LITTLE HESITATION IN FURNISHING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN LARGE QUANTITIES TO ISRAEL, YET ARE VERY RELUCTANT TO SELL OR PROVIDE EVEN MODEST QUANTITIES OF LESS SOPHISTICATED OR LIKE ITEMS TO JORDAN. THEY POINT OUT THAT JORDAN HAS BEEN A LONG-TIME FRIEND AND SUPPORTER OF THE U.S. AND ITS POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT IT IS BEING DENIED MILITARY EQUIPMENT IT NEEDS FOR LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST FAR BETTER ARMED THREATS FROM IRAQ AND EVEN POSSIBLY SYRIA.

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(2) A CONSTANT IRRITANT, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS BEEN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION OF RELEASABILITY OF ADDITIONAL PORTABLE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE WEAPONS SUCH AS THE REDEYE. JORDAN WOULD PREFER THE STINGER, BUT HAS INDICATED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THE REDEYE AS AN ALTERNATIVE. JORDAN BELIEVES A SYSTEM OF THIS TYPE IS AN ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE ONE NEEDED FOR THE PROTECTION OF ITS TROOP ELEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE US IS FURNISHING THE HAWK SYSTEM, THE JORDANIANS POINT OUT THAT MANEUVERING COMBAT ELEMENTS WILL BENEFIT LITTLE FROM THE HAWK, IT HAVING BEEN PROVIDED TO JORDAN IN A LARGELY NON-MOBILE CONFIGURATION FOR REASONS WHICH ARE WELL KNOWN. JORDAN ALREADY HAS SOME 258 REDEYES IN ITS INVENTORY, SO IT IS NOT A MATTER OF INTRODUCING A NEW SYSTEM INTO THE AREA, BUT MERELY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL MISSILES. STATE 044128 OF FEBRUARY 20, 1978 SUGGESTS THA AMBASSADOR NOT DISCUSS THE REDEYE WITH THE JORDANIANS SINCE THERE MAY BE A NEED FOR "NEW POLICY DECISIONS." WE BELIEVE A POLICY DECISION SHOULD NOW BE SOUGHT ON ONE OR BOTH OF THESE SYSTEMS. EVEN THOUGH WE MIGHT NOT HAVE REDEYES OR STINGERS AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY NOW, WE URGE THAT THE USG AGREE IN PRINCIPLE NOW TO SUPPLY ONE OR THE OTHER WHEN THEY DO BECOME AVAILABLE AND GIVE A FWRM DATE ON AVAILABILITY.

(3) THE MATTER OF AH1S HELICOPTERS IS ANOTHER CASE IN POINT. IT REMAINS AN ITEM WHICH THE JORDNIANS WANT BADLY, AND ALTHOUGH A DECISION HAS APPARENTLY BEEN REACHED TO NOTIFY CONGRESS OF
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INTENTION TO SELL AH1S HELICOPTERS DURING FY79, WE ARE STILL UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER. THE AH1S SYSTEM IS OF INTEREST AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL HERE AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF USG INTENTIONS COULD BE PASSED TO GOJ.

(4) OTHER SYSTEMS REQUESTED ON THE LIST HAVE ALSO BEEN DENIED, SOME PERHAPS FOR VERY LEGITIMATE REASONS. HOWEVER, THE MANNER IN WHICH WE SAY "NO" TO JORDAN IS IMPORTANT. WHERE WE ARE PROVIDED WITH GOOD EXPLANATIONS THAT WE CAN PASS ONTO THE

JORDANIANS, THE SAYING OF "NO" BECOMES MUCH EASIER FOR EMBASSY. IN TURN, IT MAKES THE DENIAL MORE ACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN. THE JORDANIANS ARE EXTREMELY INFORMATIVE, FRANK AND DIRECT IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH US ALONG A BROAD RANGE OF IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES. WE BELIEVE THAT SIMILAR CANDOR ON OUR PART IS NECESSARY REGARDING SOME OF THE FACTORS BEHIND OUR THINKING ON THEIR ARMS REQUESTS. WE SIMPLY CANNOT HOLD THEM AT ARMS LENGTH WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECTS ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. JAF WILL PRESS FOR ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS AT JMC IN ANY CASE AND WE BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE TO HAVE ANSWERS IN ADVANCE. WE BELIEVE THIS IS AN IMPORTANT POINT TO BEAR IN MIND AND WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF DEPARTMENT COULD FURNISH REASONABLY DETAILED REASONS WHEN IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY NO. WE WOULD, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE SPECIFIC EXPLANATION FOR STINGER/REDEYE, IMPROVED TOW VEHICLE, HELLFIRE MISSILE, AN/TPQ-37, BATTERY COMPUTER SYSTEM AND F-16.

(5) I HOPE DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THAT JORDANIANS UNDERSTAND THAT FURNISHING PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA IN NO WAY COMMITS US TO FINANCING ALL THESE ITEMS THROUGH US ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. GOJ IS STILL HOPEFUL OF ACQUIRING ASSISTANCE FROM ITS OIL-RICH NEIGHBORS FOR MUCH OF ITS MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDS, BUT IS HAMSTRUNG FROM DOING SO WITHOUT SOME NOTION OF HOW MUCH THESE ITEMS COST AND WHEN THEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE.

3. ACTION REQUESTED:

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A. THAT P&B DATA BE PROVIDED EXPEDITIOUSLY ON ITEMS LISTED PARA 2(A) ABOVE.

B. THAT THE MATTER OF EXPEDITING EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY 8" HOWITZERS, BE RE-EXAMINED ONCE MORE.

C. THAT POLICY DECISIONS BE OBTAINED ON THE RELEASE OF ADDITIONAL REDEYES WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE; AND AUTHORIZATION BE OBTAINED FOR THE RELEASE TO JORDAN OF DEPARTMENT'S INTENTION TO NOTIFY CONGRESS OF AH1S SALE IN FY79.

D. THAT MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION ON SYSTEMS TO BE DENIED TO JORDANIANS LISTED PARA 2(C)(4) ABOVE BE PROVIDED.

E. WE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON ALL ABOVE ITEMS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ALLOW JAF CONSIDERABLE TIME TO PREPARE FOR FORTHCOMING JMC MEETING.

F. RESPONSES TO THESE REQUESTS SHOULD BE CAST IN A WAY THAT WOULD ALLOW THEM TO BE PRESENTED EFFECTIVELY TO KING HUSSEIN PERSONALLY BY AMBASSADOR.

4. EMBASSY IS CURRENTLY ALSO PREPARING, AND WILL FORWARD SEPARATELY, MESSAGES ADDRESSED

FULL POLITICAL, MILITARY AND FUNDING ASPECTS OF JORDAN'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WHICH KING HUSSEIN PRESENTED TO SECRETARY VANCE. PICKERING

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